Phrónêsis

Rediscovering Phrónêsis

In the twentieth century, the specifically Aristotelian concept of phrónêsis has been the explicit starting point for both Martin Heidegger's phenomenology and Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics and for trying to find ways of conceptualizing knowledge and understanding of human and social relations, alternative to the modern period's dominant attempts at transferring models of theory, data and ‘applied’ knowledge from astronomy, physics and other natural sciences to the study and practice of human individuals, culture and society. Since the ‘relaunch’ of the concept, and as part of its gradual re-appropriation, many have attempted to apply, adjust and integrate Aristotelian phrónêsis into professional and managerial practice, modern education and social research. Most interpretations [Page 624]separate phrónêsis from two other major knowledge forms in Aristotle in order to emphasize and cultivate phrónêsis as an independent alternative to epistêmê and téchnê, in other words to ‘science’ and ‘technology’ or ‘technique’. Phrónêsis is seen as a form of rationality connected to praxis, which in turn is interpreted as approximately our everyday or professional activities, in contrast to a predetermined formalism of encroaching requirements from science and technique. Based on a close reading of the Corpus Aristotelicum, the author criticizes widespread tendencies in the ‘applied’ appropriation of phrónêsis. Phrónêsis cannot be reduced to normative, applied social research and counselling within a modern division of labour between researchers and the researched or between professionals and clients, and epistêmê cannot be equated with modern science. There are differences both in kind and of degree within the Aristotelian epistêmê, and theoretical and practical philosophy cannot really be segregated. Theory should not be abandoned but differentiated and redefined. The concept of praxis as the foundation for phrónêsis, on the other hand, is more specific than our everyday or professional activities. It is also more specific than most modern hybrid concepts of ‘practice’. Different aspects of praxis must be distinguished even in its specialized Aristotelian sense.

Phrónêsis as an Intellectual Virtue or Excellence

According to Aristotle, phrónêsis is one of several ‘intellectual virtues' or ‘excellences of the mind’. A virtue is a héxis or habitus (Latin), which means an acquired ability, skill, habit or disposition and a proclivity for acting and feeling in certain ways, resulting from practice, exercise or habituation. A habitus can be either deficient or adequate in relation to standards inherent in its activity, but virtue is by definition the best habitus within its specific field or kind of activity. The activity of the intellect—in other words, thinking—consists in the use of reasoned speech or lógos. Its lógos character makes it intellectual. Its ability to use lógos correctly makes it virtuous. The common task of intellectual virtues is to attain truth by affirming and denying, as Aristotle puts it. The ‘true’ and the ‘false’ as species belong to the genus of validity in general, together with ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘expedient’ and ‘harmful’, ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’ and other validity dimensions inescapable for lógos users. In Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, phrónêsis is defined in relation to several other intellectual excellences and faculties and by connecting it to praxis (pp. iii–xiii). Sophía, or ‘theoretical wisdom’, encompasses all the virtues, both intellectual and ethical. It is part of virtue as a whole, as ‘head’ of the virtues. Sophía is composed of two intellectual virtues immediately ‘below’ it: nous and epistêmê. Both of these relate primarily to levels and aspects of things that remain the same through change. Nous moves ‘upwards' inductively from particulars and grasps basic principles, while epistêmê (‘science’) moves ‘downwards', reasoning deductively from basic and primary principles. Nous usually translates as some kind of intuitive intelligence but is also considered to be more reflective. Indeed, unfolded nous and the activity of noêsis may very well be interpreted as being inductive and searching dialogue or dialectics, in parallel to how Aristotle defines the unfolded activity of epistêmê as deductive or didactic demonstration. The previous virtues are not only intellectual but also theoretical in being non-intervening, non-normative and non-prescriptive and merely descriptive, distinguishing and analytically directed at stable elements, aspects or levels of things and activities. Other intellectual virtues such as téchnê (craft competence) and phrónêsis are non-theoretical but intervening or prescriptive, dealing with what can change or be brought into existence, depending on what we ourselves do or do not do. They concern things that we ourselves can control, in other words decide on, choose, initiate, change, develop or stop, so that the variation depends on us.

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