Naturalistic Generalization

Conceptual Overview and Discussion

Generalizing findings from research, either by receiving explicated or propositional understanding deductively from quantitative experiments, or by constructing tacit interpretive understanding inductively from qualitative inquiries, involves a transfer of knowledge from a study sample to another population. Unlike objective scientific generalization, naturalistic generalization generates possibilities for transferring knowledge more privately from subjective accounts such as case studies or stories.

Robert Stake and Deborah Trumbull introduced the term naturalistic generalization. Stake and Trumbull believed that generalizations can be made about particulars. They suggested that in addition to learning from explicated generalizations, individuals also learn from the generalizations they make during their everyday experiences as well as from the authors, teachers, and authorities in their lives. In Stake's view, naturalistic generalizations are conclusions arrived at through personal engagement in life's affairs or by vicarious experience so well constructed that readers feel as if it happened to them. Naturalistic generalization emphasizes practical, functional application of research findings that intuitively fall naturally in line with readers' ordinary experiences.

Discussing how naturalistic generalizations enable the reader to achieve personal understandings, Lincoln and Guba's 1985 work noted that this form of generalization builds on readers' tacit knowledge. In Lincoln and Guba's view, naturalistic generalizations permit detailed probing of an instance in question rather than mere surface description. As readers consider the in-depth particulars described in case studies, they may view similar circumstances in their lives with new empathy and intentionality.

Building on the idea of naturalistic generalization, Lincoln and Guba's 1985 work further established the concept of transferability (where a hypothesis developed in one context can be transferred to another context) and the concept of fittingness (where a hypothesis from one context is sufficiently congruent or “fits” in another). Naturalistic generalizations, transferability, and fittingness all rely on researchers to provide readers with the thick description and vicarious experiential accounts they need to determine if and how they will use the information in their own lives. These more interpretive processes of generalizing findings, with their heavy dependence on context and reader responsibility, are considered different from traditional scientific generalizations.

However, in 2008, Hellström argued that naturalistic generalization, transferability, and fittingness are well accommodated within already established ways of thinking about generalizing statements from one setting to another. Hellström asserted that it is premature to view these interpretive processes as a break with received scientific traditions. Rather, his examination of the philosophical roots of generalization concluded that [Page 600]most forms of generalization require researchers to organize and present their findings in ways that indicate priority points. He asserted that it is the generalization implicit in the thick description that licenses, or even models the temporal sequences of causal propagation through the story/case. So, while aspects of naturalistic generalization clearly differ from other forms of generalization, all generalizations share the common goal of deepening understanding by transferring knowledge from a study sample to another population of interest.

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